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Abstract
Evidence has accumulated documenting loss aversion for monetary and, recently, for health outcomes—meaning that, gen-
erally, losses carry more weight than equally sized gains. In the conventional Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) models, 
which comprise utility for quality and length of life, loss aversion is not taken into account. When measuring elements of the 
QALY model, commonly, the (implicit) assumption is that utility for length and quality of life are independent. First attempts 
to quantify loss aversion for QALYs typically measured loss aversion in the context of life duration, keeping quality of life 
constant (or vice versa). However, given that QALYs are multi-attribute utilities, it may be possible that the degree of loss 
aversion is dependent on, or inseparable from, quality of life and non-constant. We test this assumption using non-parametric 
methodology to quantify loss aversion, under different levels of quality of life. We measure utility of life duration for four 
health states within subjects, and present the results of a robustness test of loss aversion within the QALY model. We find 
loss aversion coefficients to be stable at the aggregate level, albeit with considerable heterogeneity at the individual level. 
Implications for applied work on prospect theory within health economics are discussed.
Keywords Loss aversion · Prospect theory · QALY · Utility of life duration · Quality of life · Robustness
JEL Classification B41 · D03 · D81 · I10
Introduction
Like other decisions, medical decisions often involve trade-
offs between gains and losses in different domains. In health 
economics, an important trade-off concerns that between 
length and quality of life (QoL), also in the context of health 
state valuations. Research in behavioral economics and psy-
chology has established that in such trade-off losses typi-
cally carry more weight than gains of the same size. This 
sensitivity to losses is referred to as loss aversion [1, 3]. 
Recently, scholars demonstrated the importance of loss aver-
sion within the health domain, both for life duration [4–7] 
and quality of life (QoL) [7–9]. In health economic analyses, 
utilities are often defined as a product of these two attributes, 
jointly comprising Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) 
[10]. Commonly, the utility function over these two out-
comes is decomposed into separate utility functions over life 
duration and QoL. This separability of QALYs is, however, 
only possible under several assumptions, which have solely 
been tested under conditions in which no distinction is made 
between gains and losses [11].
Here, we use prospect theory (PT), which incorporates 
loss aversion and judges changes from the perspective of 
some relevant reference point (RP). Bleichrodt and col-
leagues [11] established that, when considering multi-
attribute outcomes, such as QALYs, gains and losses may 
be determined per attribute with separate attribute-specific 
RPs. This also makes it possible quantify loss aversion, to 
see how much more weight losses carry than gains. Earlier 
attempts at quantifying loss aversion under PT have typically 
focused on single attributes within the QALY framework, for 
example by obtaining loss aversion for life duration while 
maintaining QoL constant [4, 5] or vice versa [8]. Although 
these studies produced similar median estimates of loss aver-
sion, with health losses receiving between 1.5 and 2 times 
more weight than gains, they did not allude to the issue of 
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separability. In other words, these studies ignored the possi-
bility that loss aversion for one attribute (e.g., length of life) 
depends on the level of the other attribute (which is typically 
held constant) and, hence, assumes loss aversion for health 
outcomes to be constant, independent of their QALY profile.
However, it could be the case that some QALY losses 
carry more weight relative to commensurate QALY gains 
than others, for example if loss aversion is more pronounced 
for more severe health states. In this article, we test this 
assumption using a non-parametric method [12] to quantify 
loss aversion over life duration, under varying levels of QoL. 
This non-parametric method was developed recently and 
allows the estimation of utility curvature and loss aversion 
without imposing parametric assumptions on either. Ear-
lier work has argued that the choice of parametric family or 
functional form restricts interpretation of subjects’ choice 
patterns, and may lead to considerable bias especially for 
extreme cases [12, 13]. This method has been adapted to and 
used in the health domain before [5].
Theoretical framework
Consider a decision maker facing choices with regard to his 
health under uncertain conditions, operationalized by pre-
senting decision makers with risky prospects representing 
different life durations and QoL. We assume completeness 
and monotonicity for both attributes. We consider lotteries 
involving chronic health profiles, described as (훽, T) , where 
β represents QoL and T duration in years. According to the 
generalized QALY model [14], a decision maker’s prefer-
ences for health profiles can be represented by the following:
with V(훽, T) being a product of U(β), the utility of β, and 
L(T) denoting the utility of T life years.
Here, we assume PT under risk with a sign-dependent 
utility function for life duration, so that gains are evaluated 
differently than losses, relative to an attribute-specific RP. 
We assume that, through instruction, it is possible to set this 
attribute-specific RP to a specific health condition 훽c and life 
duration T0 . To elicit a continuous utility function for life 
duration, we elicit a standard sequence for life duration that 
runs through L(T0) = 0 . Meanwhile, we keep QoL constant 
at 훽c throughout the task. We repeat this process under dif-
ferent levels of 훽c.
We elicit the utility function for life duration, relative 
to this RP, both for gains and losses for the different health 
states. Hence, we obtain Li(T) for each 훽c , with i = + for 
gains and i = − for losses. Li(T) is a standard ratio scale 
utility function, which is strictly increasing and real-valued 
with Li(T0) = 0 . We incorporate loss aversion by taking 
L−(T) = 휆 L(T) for T < T0 , where λ denotes a loss aversion 
(1)V(훽, T) = U(훽) × L(T),
index, with λ > 1 [= 1, < 1] indicating loss aversion [loss 
neutrality, gain seeking]. Hence, by obtaining the utility 
around the RP, the degree of loss aversion can be derived.
Methods
A total of 111 students (average age 20.23, SD = 1.52) of 
Rotterdam School of Management (61 female) participated 
in this study for a course credit reward. Experimental ses-
sions lasted for 25 min and were run with up to four subjects 
per session. One experimenter was presented in the room to 
answer questions. The experiment was computerized with 
Matlab.
To test the robustness of loss aversion, we used the non-
parametric method [12] under four levels of QoL. In other 
words, each subject completed the non-parametric method 
four times, with a different 훽c throughout each of these four 
phases. This process allows us to obtain estimates of utility 
curvature and loss aversion for each of the four levels of 
QoL, and compare them within subjects.
QoL was defined by means of EQ-5D-5L health state 
descriptions [15], which utilize five domains: mobility, self-
care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depres-
sion. The 5L version of the EQ-5D distinguishes five levels 
of severity on each domain, ranging from ‘no problems’ to 
‘extreme problems/unable to’. Health states are typically 
denoted by 5 digit codes like 22113, with each number rep-
resenting severity of the relevant domain level of QoL. In 
this study, we used four relatively mild-to-moderate health 
states as RP 훽c in the non-parametric method: 11111, 21211, 
31221, and 32341 (see “Appendix 1” for exact description). 
This was done to have variation in health states but avoid 
states worse than dead, for which no separate procedure was 
included.
The non-parametric method used here consisted of three 
stages which are described in detail in “Appendix 2”.1 The 
first stage connects the utility for gains and losses. The sec-
ond and third stages employ the trade-off method developed 
by [16] to measure a standard sequence of outcomes in life 













This enables measuring loss aversion, without imposing par-
ametric assumptions on utility curvature.2 In addition, the 
standard sequences allow the testing of utility independence 
[11]. The three stages had slightly different instructions, pro-
viding context for the required trade-offs. The instructions 
were similar to those used by Lipman and colleagues [5]. 
1 For an elaborate, formal description of this method, see Abdellaoui 
and colleagues [12].
2 For more information on how utility curvature and loss aversion 
were determined, see “Box 1”.
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During all the stages of the experiment, it was made clear 
to subjects that they should imagine living until 70 years 
in 훽c , after which they would contract a disease, resulting 
in immediate death without any pain. Subjects completed 
a series of binary choices between two drugs which could 
change their situation (leading to gains and losses compared 
to living until 70). Employing a bi-section choice method, 
we obtained indifferences, set equal to the midpoint after the 
fifth binary choice. Some stimuli and constants relevant to 
the non-parametric method had to be set beforehand; these 
are listed in “Appendix 1”.
Results
Seven subjects were excluded from further analyses for the 
following reasons: mechanical failure (n = 2), refusing to 
incur life year losses (n = 3), and observed misbehavior (e.g., 
rushing through the task, n = 2). The results are reported 
for the reduced sample (n = 104).3 Throughout, we will first 
report aggregate analyses, where median parameters are 
compared for the whole sample, and refer to these as results 
at ‘the aggregate level’. Second, we will investigate indi-
vidual results more closely, by classifying each individual 
according to classification rules reported in “Box 1” and we 
explore within-subjects parameter instability. We refer to 
these analyses as ‘individual-level analyses’.
Table 1 demonstrates the results at the aggregate level, 
by comparing point-estimates for utility curvature and loss 
aversion for each health state. We compared differences 
between health states using omnibus tests (i.e., compar-
ing all four health states simultaneously), more specifically 
Friedman’s tests, which are robust against the violations 
of normality typically observed for parameters under the 
definitions reported in “Box 1”. Next, we compared all 
health states in pairs with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. For 
the omnibus tests, no significant differences were observed 
between health states, both for utility curvature and loss 
aversion (all p’s > 0.06). When comparing parameter esti-
mates in pairs of health states, some significant differences 
were observed. For loss aversion under both definitions, 
parameter estimates for β2 were significantly lower than for 
β3 (p’s < 0.03). All other pairwise comparisons for loss aver-
sion yielded no significant differences (all p’s > 0.07). Using 
pairwise comparisons for utility curvature, we observe no 
significant differences for both parametric and non-paramet-
ric estimations (all p’s > 0.05).
In general, we observe close to linear utility for all health 
states, both for gains and losses.4 Furthermore, we observe 
considerable loss aversion at the aggregate level, with λ sig-
nificantly greater than 1 for all 훽c (Wilcoxon tests: p < 0.001 
for all β’s).
Table 2 demonstrates how subjects classify under differ-
ent estimations of utility curvature and loss aversion (see 
“Box 1”). For all individual classifications, we observed that 
Table 1  Median (IQR in 
brackets) parameter point-
estimates for loss aversion 
under two definitions and utility 
curvature as defined by area 
under the curve (AUC) and 
power utility
Health state β0: 11111 β1: 21211 β2: 31221 β3: 32341
Utility curvature
 AUC—gains 0.51 (0.42–0.63) 0.49 (0.38–0.59) 0.53 (0.44–0.64) 0.52 (0.41–0.70)
 AUC—losses 0.51 (0.46–0.57) 0.50 (0.45–0.57) 0.50 (0.42–0.58) 0.49 (0.40–0.60)
 Power—gains 0.96 (0.58–1.37) 1.07 (0.69–1.71) 0.91 (0.57–1.28) 0.78 (0.45–1.41)
 Power—losses 0.93 (0.74–1.16) 0.94 (0.73–1.20) 0.97 (0.73–1.41) 1.02 (0.66–1.40)
Loss aversion
 Köbberling Wakker 1.97 (1.33–4.43) 1.93 (1.45–3.67) 1.88 (1.39–3.30) 2.13 (1.15–8.38)
 Kahneman Tversky 2.13 (1.24–4.39) 1.94 (1.26–4.62) 2.10 (1.25–3.23) 2.51 (1.18–6.24)
Table 2  Individual classifications for utility curvature (n = concave, 
linear, convex) and loss aversion (n = loss averse, loss neutral, and 
gain seeking)
Health state β0: 11111 β1: 21211 β2: 31221 β3: 32341
Utility curvature
 AUC—gains 55, 0, 49 47, 0, 54 61, 0, 43 61, 0, 43
 AUC—losses 44, 0, 60 42, 0, 62 49, 0, 55 56, 0, 48
 Power—gains 54, 0, 50 47, 0, 57 62, 0, 42 65, 0, 39




90, 0, 14 92, 0, 12 95, 0, 9 89, 0, 15
 Kahneman/Tver-
sky [1]
86, 0, 15 85, 0, 17 89, 0, 13 82, 0, 18
3 The conventional post hoc power analyses suggested this sample 
was sufficiently powerful to enable detecting differences with at least 
small-effect sizes (Cohen’s d < 0.3), assuming α = 0.05 and statistical 
power at the recommended 80% level [17].
4 Wilcoxon tests comparing non-parametric curvature estimates with 
AUC 0.5, and parametric estimates with 훼 = 1 , produced no signif-
icant results for all β (all p’s > 0.08), with one exception: β1 power 
utility for gains, p = 0.04.
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the conventionally assumed loss neutrality and linear util-
ity curvature are not present in our data. Although, at the 
aggregate level, linear utility was found, when classifying 
individually, considerable heterogeneity in utility curva-
ture was observed, with proportions of concave/convexity 
varying between definitions and health states. This finding 
could be explained by the near equal division of concavity/
convexity in our sample, resulting in roughly linear utility 
at the aggregate level. For loss aversion, however, such an 
equal division was not visible, with the majority of subjects 
classifying as loss averse across definitions and health states.
Our design allowed exploring point-estimate stability for 
utility curvature and loss aversion between different levels 
of 훽c . To this end, we calculated the difference between the 
smallest and largest estimates within subjects (e.g., the low-
est and highest 휆 ). Furthermore, to allude to within-subjects 
heterogeneity in classification, we calculated the propor-
tion of subjects for whom classifications were dependent on 
health states (e.g., loss averse for β0–2 and gain seeking for 
β3). Both exploratory measures of within-subjects parameter 
and classification variance demonstrated considerable het-
erogeneity between health states (see Table 3). Finally, we 
investigated whether systematic patterns in utility curvature 
or loss aversion could be observed in our sample. To this 
end, we determined the extent to which subjects showed 
monotonically increasing (or decreasing) parameters (see 
Table 3). For loss aversion, this classification indicated that 
subjects became more (less) loss averse for increasing health 
state severity for 훽c . These analyses indicate that these pat-
terns did occur, but only for a small part of our sample, 
again suggesting non-systematic heterogeneity of parameter 
estimates.
Discussion
In this paper, we compared estimates for utility curvature 
and loss aversion for QALY outcomes under four levels of 
QoL, to test the robustness of these estimates. An extensive 
literature exists testing the validity of QALY models, which 
has documented mixed evidence with regard to the separa-
bility of life duration and QoL [e.g., 18–21]. In addition, 
many authors have investigated utility independence with 
regard to health state valuation (e.g., the relation between 
utilities and time horizon in the standard gambles), find-
ing many descriptive violations of this independence [for a 
review, see: 20]. Ours was the first experimental test of this 
separability for QALY gains and losses separately, and we 
also tested the robustness of loss aversion. Our results, at 
the aggregate level, provided evidence that estimations of 
loss aversion and utility curvature are independent of QoL. 
However, loss aversion and utility curvature estimates were 
heterogeneous at the individual level, i.e., varied consider-
ably between health states for the same individual.
Our findings are in many regards similar to earlier work 
that measured PT for QALY outcomes. We observed con-
siderable loss aversion (defined over length of life), as was 
found in similar magnitude in earlier work applying similar 
methodology [5, 22], or with different elicitation methods [4, 
8]. In contrast to what was observed in earlier applications of 
the non-parametric method for health outcomes [5, 22], we 
found linear utility for both gains and losses at the aggregate 
level. Applying a parametric approach to our non-parametric 
measurements did not affect these conclusions. However, 
when estimating individual classifications, we found none 
for whom our data supported this linearity, as we observed 
a near equal spread in concave/convex utility (i.e., averaging 
out to linear).
We document considerable heterogeneity in param-
eter estimates between subjects, and also observed such 
Table 3  Exploration of within-
subjects heterogeneity for 
different health states
Parameter point-estimate 






 AUC—gains 0.26 75% 6% / 7%
 AUC—losses 0.18 76% 4% / 7%
 Power—gains 1.17 73% 7% / 7%




5.10 37% 8% / 7%
 Kahneman Tver-
sky [1]
4.17 49% 6% / 7%
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heterogeneity within subjects for different health states. Our 
exploratory analyses did not uncover systematic or mono-
tonic patterns in this within-subjects heterogeneity. An 
explanation related to our chosen chained utility elicitation 
method could be that these individual differences occurred 
as a result of preference imprecision [23]. Such ‘noisy pref-
erences’ could result in error propagation, i.e., cascading 
of errors or imprecision in the early stages of our chained 
method into later stages, producing differences in parameters 
between health states when errors occur randomly. Although 
earlier work using similar methodology [5, 24] observed no 
effects of error propagation, we cannot rule out it affected 
current results. Another factor contributing to possible error 
propagation in our study could be that we opted to obtain 
indifferences via bi-section only (to reduce complexity), 
whereas earlier work [5, 12] using this method applied a 
slider to obtain indifferences, allowing subjects to correct 
errors adaptively. Future work could explore this further, 
for example by adding a slider to obtain indifference points, 
using non-chained methodology, or running an error propa-
gation simulation.
Some additional limitations of this study deserve noting. 
First, since this study involved a first test of independence 
of loss aversion in health, we used a convenience sample 
consisting of students. Of course, future extensions pref-
erably should include representative samples to general-
ize our findings. Although power analyses suggested that 
our sample was adequately powered to detect small effects, 
using a larger sample could, perhaps, result in the detec-
tion of smaller effects, also given the large heterogeneity 
for parameter estimates reported here. Second, we assumed 
that it is possible to set the RP through instruction, while 
it may be the case that respondents took another RP in 
mind. Still, given the high loss aversion coefficients that we 
found, it seems plausible that our respondents, indeed, held 
the induced RP in mind. Finally, our study used four mild-
to-moderate health states, including perfect health, while 
the EQ-5D descriptive system enables many more possible 
health states, with more severe health problems than our 
selection. Given the aim of our study, this is a clear limita-
tion, as, perhaps, these states where insufficiently spaced 
in terms of utility for us to observe systematic patterns in 
loss aversion or utility curvature parameters. However, 
our empirical approach required us to make a fundamen-
tal assumption: monotonicity. The non-parametric method 
breaks down if monotonicity is not satisfied, i.e., if subjects 
prefer to lose years of life instead of gaining them. For more 
severe health states, monotonicity need not always hold [25]. 
Obviously, many other mild health states were available for 
our purposes, but to reduce cognitive strain for our subjects 
that we decided on including just four. For reference, these 
four health profiles receive utility weights ranging from 1.00 
to 0.46 in the Dutch tariff [26], which we considered to be 
sufficient for our purposes. Future work could replicate our 
findings with a different or larger selection of health states.
Our findings may have implications for policy makers 
and researchers aiming to apply PT measurements to health-
related decision-making. Our results imply that median 
parameters in applications of PT may have merit, as these 
estimates appear to be robust across different scenarios (in 
terms of QoL). For example, our work warrants the conclu-
sion that, at the aggregate level, life year losses are weighed 
twice as much as similarly sized gains, regardless of QoL 
level. However, as our exploratory analyses of within-subject 
heterogeneity demonstrated, individuals’ loss aversion and 
utility curvature may depend on the health state used during 
elicitation. This heterogeneity at the individual level may be 
problematic for approaches using averages, like median-opti-
mized parameters (e.g., [27]). When aiming to address PT 
biases for QALYs [28], such as loss aversion, at the individ-
ual level, our data would suggest that assuming such median 
loss aversion parameters may misrepresent individuals’ 
actual preferences and trade-offs. When one aims to apply 
PT to allude to biases in individual cases (e.g., in health state 
valuation), an individual approach may be more suitable, 
given both the considerable between subjects and between-
health states’ heterogeneity reported in this study. Such cor-
rections with individually estimated parameters could be too 
time-consuming and labor-intensive when applied separately 
for each economic evaluation. However, in many countries, 
such as the UK, QALYs are not derived individually, but 
from indirect preference-based classification systems, such 
as EQ5D or SF6D via social tariff lists [29]. Recent develop-
ments in de-biasing QALY measurement [5] suggest that it 
may be suitable and possible to apply the correction for PT 
at the individual level to obtain value sets for these social 
tariffs [see 30].5 When considering such individual correc-
tion, however, it seems important to consider which health 
state is used to quantify PT parameters.
In conclusion, although we observed large heterogeneity 
of loss aversion and utility of life duration depending on 
QoL, we failed to observe systematic patterns in this depend-
ence, and observed no differences on average. Future work 
should aim to address whether this heterogeneity is method-
dependent or due to systematic differences between indi-
viduals or health states. For now, it appears that, on average, 
loss aversion is equal across health states, i.e., a QALY loss 
5 Although recent developments [5] suggest that it may be possible 
to de-bias QALYs at the individual level, several important questions 
with regard to the reliability of PT parameters and the validity of cor-
rections based on these estimates remain unanswered. We believe that 
these warrant discussion before corrections based on PT are applied 
to correct value sets for social tariffs, as is discussed by [30].
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is a QALY loss is a QALY loss, and it receives approxi-
mately twice as much weight as equally sized QALY gains.
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Appendix 1: Health states used 
in experiment
See Table 4 for more elaborate information on the health 
states that were utilized in this study.
Appendix 2: Description of experimental 
method (adapted from Lipman et al. [5])
Introduction and framing
Subjects were asked to imagine that they would live until 
70 years in a health state denoted as health state C. This 
health state C would be varied for each repetition (4 in total) 
of the non-parametric method (i.e., 훽c ). After becoming 70, 
they were instructed that they would contract a deadly dis-
ease, which would lead to a direct, painless death. Their 
task was to compare two drugs and indicate their prefer-
ences between treatments given their health state C and the 
treatment options, which could be risky, or involve possible 
side-effects (i.e., losses of life).
Stages of non‑parametric method
The non-parametric method is chained, i.e., answers from 
the previous stage carry over to the next, meaning that dif-
ferences in questions may exist between subjects. For a 
completely general description of the method, we refer to 
Abdellaoui and colleagues [12]. Throughout, as is common 
for applications of the trade-off method [16], any risky gam-
ble had 50% chance (p = 0.5) of success. We denote such 
Table 4  Health state descriptions based on EQ-5D-5L
Health state β0: 11111 β1: 21211 β2: 31221 β3: 32341
Dutch Tariff [26] 1.00 0.88 0.79 0.46
You have … problems with walking No Slight Moderate Moderate
You have … problems with washing and dressing yourself No No No Slight
You have … problems with washing and dressing yourself No Slight Slight Moderate
… pain or discomfort No No Slight Severe
… anxious or depressed Not Not Not Not
Table 5  Stimuli used in the 





Stage 1 L GpL ∼ T0 U(x+1 ) = −U(x−1 ) G = 5 years
p =  0.5
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gambles as XpY  , meaning that X is obtained with prob-
ability p, and Y otherwise. In our adaptation of the non-
parametric method, outcomes (i.e., X and Y) reflected life 
years. Importantly, it was emphasized throughout that any 
life years gained or lost were to be spent in health state C. 
All indifferences were obtained via bi-section. Whenever a 
variable was elicited, a starting level had to be set to start the 
bi-section method. We chose to set it, such that the expected 
value would be equal for both treatments that subjects could 
choose from. For example, when eliciting the indifference 
Z ∼ 10p0 , we would start at Z = 5. This experiment was 
completely counterbalanced, meaning that health state order 
and gain–loss order were randomized between subjects. All 
pre-specified stimuli and elicited indifferences can be found 
in Table 5.
Stage 1: Connecting gains and losses
Subjects first faced a mixed gamble, which could increase 
their length of life by G years with probability p, or other-
wise decrease it by L years. They could also choose to take a 
drug that gave 0 years. The negative outcome Lwas elicited 
by obtaining the following indifference GpL ∼ T0 , where T0 
indicates living until 70 in state C. As can be seen from 
Table 5, G was fixed at 5, while L was initially set at 2.5 and 
varied based on individual choices.
Next, two certainty equivalents (CEs) were elicited, 
which would form the starting points of the standard 
sequences elicited in stages 2 and 3. The CE for gains, i.e., 
the starting point for stage 2 was elicited by offering subjects 
a choice between a certain gain x+
1
 in life years (in state C), 
and a gamble offering G (i.e., 5 years) with probability p, 
and 0 years otherwise. The amount of life years gained by 
taking the certain drug (x+
1
) was varied to obtain indiffer-
ence x+
1
∼ GpT0 . For losses, this procedure was exactly the 
same, i.e., subjects were offered a choice between a certain 
drug resulting in a loss of x−
1
 life years in state C, and a risky 
drug. To introduce the loss domain, we instructed them that 
they had contracted another fatal disease that should also 
be treated, and thus explained their likely loss compared to 
T0 (i.e., 70 years in C). We thus elicited x−1 ∼ LpT0 , provid-
ing the starting point ( x−
1
 ) for eliciting utility for losses in 
stage 3.
Stages 2 & 3: Trade‑off method to elicit utility for gains 
and losses
The trade-off method consists of comparisons between two 
lotteries. Within our framing, this consisted of two risky 
drugs, which could increase subjects’ life duration in state C 
to a different extent. In addition, both drugs could have risks 
of adverse effects, and thus decrease lifetime in state C. To 
introduce the loss domain, subjects were instructed that they 
had contracted another fatal disease for which treatment was 
required. Subjects were instructed that they would compare 
a series of drugs to each other. This series constituted the 
procedure to elicit the standard sequence, which consists of 
a sequence of outcomes equally spaced in terms of utility 
(see [16] for proof).
Stage 2, i.e., the trade-off method for gains, commenced 
by us setting 퓁 , a small offset-loss of 1 year in state C. Sub-
jects were offered a choice between two risky drugs: one 
would offer x+
1p
 , where  is a larger offset-loss which we 
aimed to elicit, while the other would offer 퓁pT0 . We varied 
 t o obtain the indifference x+
1p
 ∼ 퓁pT0 . Next, we elicited 




) by eliciting indifferences 





Stage 3, i.e., the trade-off method for losses, commenced 
by us setting ℊ , a small offset-gain of 1 year in state C. Sub-
jects were offered a choice between two risky drugs: one 
would offer px−1  where  is a larger offset-gain which we 
aimed to elicit, while the other would offer ℊpT0 . We varied 
 t o obtain the indifference px−1 ∼ ℊpT0 . Next, we elicited 






) by eliciting indiffer-
ences in the form of px−j ∼ ℊpx−(j−1).
Repeating this procedure four times—for each health state 
(see Table 4)—resulted in four utility curves, and allowed us 
to obtain loss aversion parameters and both parametric and 
non-parametric estimates of utility curvature (see “Box 1”).
Box 1: Analyses of utility curvature and loss 
aversion
We non-parametrically calculated the area under the 
curve for Li(T) , which was normalized to [0, 1] , for gains 
and [0,−1] for losses. If utility is linear, the area under 
this normalized curve equals one-half for both gains and 
losses. Utility for gains in life duration is convex (con-
cave) if the area under the curve is smaller (larger) than 
one-half, while, for losses, the opposite direction holds 
(convex > ½, concave < ½). Second, we fitted a para-
metric utility curve to our data by employing the power 
family, with the utility of life duration defined as x훼 with 
𝛼 > 0 . As is well known, for gains [losses] 𝛼 > 1 corre-
sponds to convex [concave] utility, 훼 = 1 corresponds to 
linear utility, and 𝛼 < 1 corresponds to concave [convex] 
utility.
Kahneman and Tversky [1] defined loss aversion (λ) 
as −U(−x) > U(x) for all x > 0 . To measure loss aversion 









) for j = 1,… , 5 . 





) could usually not be observed directly and thus 
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were determined through linear interpolation. Subjects 
were classified as loss averse if −U(−x)∕U(x) > 1 for 
more than half of the observations, as loss neutral if 
−U(−x)∕U(x) = 1 for more than half of the observations, 
and as gain seeking if −U(−x)∕U(x) < 1 for more than 
half of the observations.
Köbberling and Wakker [2] provided an easier method 
to determine loss aversion. They defined loss aversion 
(λ) as the kink of utility at the reference point. That is, 





(0) , with U�
↑
(0) rep-
resenting the left derivative and U�
↓
(0) the right deriva-
tive of U at the reference point. To operationalize this 
definition, we computed each subject’s coefficient of loss 













 are the loss and gain elicited closest to the 
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